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Abstract 
Before the recent surge in oil prices, the Saudi Arabian economy was 
showing signs of slow-down and stagnation. The economy appeared 
incapable of sustaining growth without a rising infusion of oil revenues. 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the main factors responsible for the 
on-going economic deterioration. An analysis of government expenditures 
suggests a major factor responsible for the country’s economic decline is 
deterioration in the links between government expenditures and the non-
oil sectors of the economy. In large part, the declining effectiveness of 
government expenditures in stimulating private sector activity can be 
attributed to the high priority the government gave to social expenditures 
and defense. The implications are that if the economy is to achieve self-
sustained growth independent of developments in the oil sector, 
government expenditures will have to be refocused on activates that 
directly support private sector investment. The welfare state will have to 
be scaled back and a higher priority given economic allocations. More 
emphasis must be placed on efficiency and productivity in government 
activities. 
 
“The problem in Saudi Arabia is that the middle class is shrinking, and the 
more poverty you have, the more fundamentalism you have.” 
“I think there is no choice any longer. It is a kind of imperative. Either you 
change the essence of our political culture or you just vanish.” 
Turki Hamad 
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1. Introduction 
For an increasing number of citizens, the Saudi Arabia of the heady 
years following the 1973/74 oil price revolution is a land of fable and 
memory. Yet to many outside the Kingdom, the country’s economic 
statistics may come as a shock. Population growth (about 3.3 percent per 
year) has exceeded GDP growth for several decades causing a decline in 
per capita GDP (in inflation adjusted US dollars, from more than US 
$15,000 in 1980 to a about US $9,000 in 2003. There is high 
unemployment—20 to 30 percent by some measures, while up to 20-30 
percent of the population is below the poverty line. Translating these 
figures into more tangible signs of trouble for the Saudi Government, 
Kim Murphy (2003: A1) has observed: 
The dozen years since the Persian Gulf War have witnessed slums 
develop on the outskirts of Jeddah and Riyadh, the capital. Beggars hawk 
bottles of water at intersections. Penniless women huddle in strips of 
shade outside their crumbling mud-brick houses, begging for money. 
Many families in the capital are so poor they can’t afford electricity. Raw 
sewage runs through parts of Jeddah... The increasingly perilous 
economic situation that all in Saudi Arabia but the royalty face today may 
be a big factor in recruiting young Saudis to terrorist groups such as Al 
Qaeda. Chronic joblessness, diminished incomes and difficulty in 
collecting enough money to marry and start families are all issues that 
can evoke anger. 
The deteriorating economic situation is manifesting itself in new and 
troubling ways. Virtually crime free since its founding, the country’s 
deeply conservative Islamic society is grappling with rapidly increasing 
crime. Crime among young jobless Saudis rose by 320 percent between 
1990 and 1996, and was expected to go up by another 136 percent by 
2005 (Bradley, 2003). 
To counter these trends, Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto leader of 
the kingdom, has announced plans for sweeping reforms including 
privatization, liberalization and diversification of the economy1. However 
there are no easy solutions. One problem stems from the fact that 
conservative opposition within the ruling family remains strong and 
presents significant obstacles that appear to be limiting the pace of reform   
(Trofimov, 2003: A12). Another problem is that, barring major reforms, 
the financial cost of the state-led diversification of the economy over the 
next twenty years may reach upwards of US $100 billion. The country’s 
national debt is already over 100 percent of its GDP—the government, 
                                               
1
  For an excellent overview of the problems facing Crown Prince Abdullah, see Kechichian 
(2003: 100-15).  
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even with an improved oil picture may simply not be in a position to 
finance the diversification of the economy without extensive private 
sector participation.  
On the other hand, bringing in private foreign investors is not without 
its problems. Obviously the increased presence of foreign businessmen 
will only further strain the relationship between the government and the 
kingdom’s more traditional groups. This is assuming, of course, that the 
government would be able to convince the foreign investment community 
that the kingdom is a secure place to do business, and not a potential 
battleground between the royal family-dominated government and 
international terrorists. 
Saudi Arabia’s problems have been decades in the making and 
certainly will not be solved in the short or perhaps even medium term. 
The purpose of the sections that follow is to attempt to identify the main 
factors responsible for the on-going economic deterioration. Have 
fundamental changes taken place in the economy, perhaps since 1980, to 
cause the decline in non-oil economic growth? If so, what are they, and 
what are the implications for the future? 
2. Trends in the Economy 
The inability of the Saudi non-oil economy to sustain high rates of 
growth can best seen from the actual historical record (Table 1).  The 
overall rate of real non-oil GDP averaged 7.4 percent over the 1960-2002 
period  (7.1 percent from 1970 to 2002). However, an expansion since 
1980 of 2.3 percent has not even kept up with the growing population. 
While one might argue that the -0.9 percent average annual decline in oil 
GDP between 1980 and 2002 is the main factor responsible for this sub-
par performance, government expenditures, the means through which oil 
revenues are actually spread through the economy, grew at the higher rate 
of 3.0% per annum.   
Table 1 
Saudi Arabia: GDP Growth 1960-2002 
(average annual rate of growth) 
GDP Measure 1960-2002 1970-2002 1980-2002 
Non-Oil 7.4          7.1     2.3 
Private 8.8 8.9 2.0 
Public 5.9 5.1 3.0 
Total 5.7 4.7 1.0 
        Note: Data are for aggregate domestic output 
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While an exhaustive examination of the factors underlying this 
deterioration in Saudi non-oil economic growth are beyond the scope of 
this paper, several important patterns, mainly evolving since the early 
1980s, have a great bearing on the issues at hand. 
2.1. Public/Private Composition of Gross Domestic Product 
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency2 breaks the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) into three main categories: public sector output, 
private sector output and the oil sector’s contribution to GDP. Here the 
main patterns of interest (Figure 1) center around the relative growth of 
private sector output as a percentage of total GDP. In the pre-1973/74 
period, private sector activity accounted for around 30 percent of the 
country’s output. This fell slightly following the 1973/74 oil price 
increases, only to steadily increase to 60 percent by 1985. Since that date, 
private sector output has declined gradually, leveling off at around 48 
percent of output. 
 
Figure 1 
Saudi Arabia: Public/Private Sector Composition of GDP 































 Note: Based on data in Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. 
 
 
                                               
2
  Unless otherwise specified all macroeconomic data used here are from the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency Annual Report, various issues.  
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 5 
In contrast, the public sector’s output averaged around 12 percent 
before 1973/74. After that date, the public sector’s share increased 
steadily to slightly over 20 percent (1983), thereafter leveling off at 
around 18 percent through 2002. Finally, the oil sector averaged around 
55 percent of GDP prior to the 1973/74 oil price increases. After that 
date, the sector’s share of output declined sharply to around 20 percent in 
1985. The sector’s share in total output increased throughout the rest of 
the 1980s, leveling off at around 35 percent of output starting in the early 
1990s. 
If an oil country’s success is depicted by its diversification away from 
a dependence on oil revenues, then the Saudi picture is mixed. The 
private sector has been able to expand its share of output to the point that 
it now accounts for around half of the kingdom’s GDP. However, this is 
actually   10 percent lower than that attained in the mid-1980s. While the 
sector appears capable of sustaining this percentage of output through 
very different periods of oil prices and revenues, indicating some 
independence from year to year oil market fluctuations, the sector has not 
shown it is capable of high rates of sustained growth. Interestingly, the 
public sector’s share of output has been quite stable since the early 1980s.  
2.2. Composition of Output by Sectors 
One of the more striking features of Saudi Arabian economic growth 
since the mid-1960s has been the sharp changes in the composition of 
non-oil output (Figure 2). Clearly the 1973/74 oil price increases had a 
significant impact on the construction, trade and housing sectors. Of these 
sectors, construction, and housing have leveled off at around 12 percent 
for the former and 8 percent for the latter of private sector output. On the 
other hand, trade (retail and wholesale) has averaged around 27 percent 
of private sector expenditures since the late 1980s.  
Another feature of interest is the fact that the agricultural sector, after 
declining in relative importance up to the early 1980s, has increased its 
share of non-oil private output from around 8 percent at that time to a 
relatively stable 17-18 percent beginning in the late 1980s. The most 
stable activity appears to be the non-oil manufacturing sector. This 
sector’s share in private sector output was not affected by the 1973/74 oil 
boom. Instead, it has gradually increased its share of private sector output 
from about 5 percent in 1968 to around 14 percent in 2002. 
From these patterns, it appears that while great strides have been made 
in increasing total private sector output, the composition of that output in 
many regards—agriculture, trade, construction and housing have returned  
to  their pre-oil boom pattern. The main exception is the non-refining 
private sector manufacturing sector which, as noted, has gradually 
increased its share of output.  
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Figure 2 
Saudi Arabia: Sector Shares 




























    Note: Based on data in Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. 
 
2.3. Public/Private Composition of Expenditures 
The composition of output between public/private consumption and 
investment has also developed several interesting patterns over time     
(Figure 3). Here, the most stable series is private investment, averaging 
slightly above 10 percent of total expenditures. Interestingly, the share of 
private sector investment was not significantly affected by the 1973/74 
oil price increases, nor did it expand in line with the post-1973/74 to 1985 
expansion in the share of private sector activity in GDP noted above.  
In contrast, private consumption’s share of expenditures dropped from 
a high of 70 percent in 1960 to around 30 percent at the time of the 
1973/74 oil price increases.  Since that time private consumption, while 
fluctuating a bit, has increased back up to around half of total 
expenditures. Public consumption gradually increased from less than 20 
percent of expenditures in 1960 to around 30 percent at the time of the 
1973/74oil price increases. Since that date, the public sectors 
consumption has fluctuated in the low 30s, with no particular trend.  
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Figure 3 
Saudi Arabia: Public/Private Sector Composition of Expenditures 



























    Note: Based on data in Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. 
 
Of the four expenditure variables, public investment has shown the 
most notable trends, gradually increasing its share of expenditures from 
near zero in 1960, up to around 25 percent in 1975. Since that date public 
expenditures have shown a gradually declining trend, winding up at 
around 5 percent by 2002. 
These patterns and trends suggest that economic pressures are 
mounting—falling (public) and stagnant private investment rates in the 
context of a rapidly growing population mean increased domestic 
bottlenecks and capacity constraints reducing the country’s sustainable 
growth potential.  Many of these constraints, power shortages and the like 
are reported on a regular basis in the popular press.  
2.4. Patterns of Public-Private Expenditure/Non-Oil Output 
Another way of looking at the problem of the kingdom’s rather low 
rates of investment is to compare the various expenditure items to non-oil 
GDP.  Again, there are several relatively stable patterns and several that 
depict longer-term trends (Figure 4). Private expenditures have 
maintained a relatively  stable  pattern  with  respect  to  non-oil  GDP—
largely fluctuating between 80 and 100 percent of output. The early 
1990s experienced an increase in this ratio, followed by a fairly sharp 
contraction from 1996 to 2002. Overall consumption (public plus private) 
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also reflects this pattern, albeit at a higher level averaging around 120 
percent of non-oil GDP, with imports balancing supply and demand. 
On the other hand, public expenditures increased fairly steadily over 
the twenty year period up to 1980, only to decline fairly steadily since 
then, although in recent years they have leveled off at around 55 percent 
of non-oil GDP. Investment also reflects this pattern, rising fairly steadily 
to over 60 percent of non-oil GDP in the late 1970s, only to decline to 
around 22 percent throughout the 1990s. Of course it is not just 
investment that is important in determining future rates of growth in non-
oil GDP, but a country of Saudi Arabia’s vast resources should be able to 
mobilize larger amounts of capital. Investment as a share of non-oil GDP 
has essentially returned to the levels found in the 1960s. Again the 
inability of the country to devote more funds to capital formation will 
limit the economy’s ability to just keep up with the rapidly expanding 
population.  
Figure 4 
Saudi Arabia: Public/Private Expenditures Relative to Non-Oil Output 




































     Note: Based on data in Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. 
 
2.5. Public Expenditures 
As is well known, the kingdom has experienced on-going budget 
difficulties since the mid-1980s. Growing deficits have been the norm, 
with non-oil revenues unable to pick up the slack during periods of 
falling oil revenues. What is less well known is that the composition of 
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public expenditures has been undergoing some profound changes during 
this period. Aggregating the main budgetary items into four main groups, 
several patterns stand out (Figure 5). Corresponding to the declines in 
investment noted above, economic expenditures (economic services, 
transport and com-munications, and infrastructure) have declined steadily 
since 1980, from around 25 percent of the budget at that time to a little 
over 7 percent by 2003.  
Social expenditures (human resource development and health) have 
been the major beneficiaries of the decline in economic allocations more 
than doubling their share of the budget over the period 1979-2003 (from 
13 percent to nearly 32 percent of total expenditures). Defense remains 
the largest budgetary item, fluctuating in the 35-40 percent range in the 
period after 1988. 
Figure 5 
Saudi Arabia: Structure of Government Budget 




























    Note: Based on data in Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. 
 
Finally public expenditures (administration, loans and subsidies) have 
shown the most erratic pattern. After fluctuating around 35 percent of the 
budget between 1979 and 1994, they fell sharply to less than 20 percent 
in 1999, only to increase to about 27 percent in 2003.  The sharp decline 
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in public expenditures in the early-mid 1990s stemmed, in part, from a 
sharp cut-back in the government’s loan programs. 
3. Key Economic Linkages3 
The patterns described are suggestive of an environment in which the 
public sector is contracting in many areas. This is especially the case with 
regard to economic expenditures and other activities directly supportive 
of the private sector. Budgetary shifts away from economic categories are 
the most obvious manifestation of this phenomenon. Falling shares of 
investment relative  to  non-oil  output  are  also indicative of the 
kingdom’s capital stock and productive expenditures playing much less 
of a stimulative role as in the unbalanced growth strategy (Looney, 1995) 
implicit in the early oil boom years.   
More subtle shifts in policy or policy effectiveness can only be 
inferred from a statistical analysis of the patterns noted above. Of 
particular importance are the linkages between public and private sector 
expenditures / output on non-oil production and investment. If a 
connection exists between these variables, how much can be attributed to 
short-run effects—oil shocks and the like, and how much represents 
longer term affinities? For example, private sector investment is likely to 
be stimulated with an oil boom led expansion of public infrastructure 
investment, but over time is it dependent on ongoing government 
investment or could be sustained by non-public induced investment 
opportunities? Have these patterns changed over time? Resolving issues 
of this type is a critical first step in designing a reform strategy for the 
country.   
To identify the main policy relevant linkages in the Saudi economy a   
co-integration error-correction analysis was undertaken. While mathe-
matically fairly technical, this technique has a straightforward intuitive 
appeal. Cointegration/error-correction attempts to determine whether two 
series (such as private expenditures and private sector output) move 
together over long periods of time4 due to some sort of real 
interconnection.   
If  for example in the case Saudi Arabia, we find that this relationship 
exists between say government expenditure and private sector output, 
then it would be safe to conclude that private sector output could not be 
sustained without a steady infusion of government expenditures. More 
precisely, the analysis accepts the fact that short run shocks can occur 
                                               
3
  This section updates and extends the analysis undertaken in Looney (2001). 
4
  For a detailed description of the technique and methods of estimation, see Pesaran and      
Pesaran, 1997: 106-9). 
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whereby rapid increases (say, public sector investment) in one variable 
cause movement in the other (i.e., construction).  However, if the two 
variables have developed a long-run linkage, whereby an ongoing-stable 
set of links have been established, then equilibrium will be restored with 
the speed of adjustment affected by the deviation from that long run 
pattern. Specifically, the speed of the longer term adjustment will be 
dependent on the magnitude of the deviation from the long run 
equilibrium pattern as well as the strength of the linkage between the two 
variables.  In short, the year-to-year growth over time of a sector such as 
non-oil manufacturing can be decomposed into two parts: the first 
associated with a short run shock (say increased public sector 
consumption) and the second that drawing on the longer-term linkages 
established with the causal (here public sector consumption) variable. In 
short this technique is capable of yielding insights not often captured by 
the more conventional regression methods. 
3.1. Relative Efficacy of Public Private Expenditures 
A common theme in the development literature is that 
economic processes in oil-based countries becomes more complex 
as these economies mature and begin to diversify away from a 
complete reliance on oil revenues and associated public sector 
expenditures. Using the cointegration analysis noted above, there is 
clear evidence that this process is well advanced in Saudi Arabia.  
With regard to the economy’s leading sectors (Table 1):  
1. Growth in the agricultural and mining sectors became more 
dependent on private expenditures and less dependent on public 
expenditures, especially during the 1975-2001 period. 
2. The non-oil manufacturing sector has become almost completely 
dependent on private sector expenditures, with strong linkages to these 
expenditures in both the short- and longer term. In contrast, public sector 
expenditures have little stimulative effects on the sector. 
3. Traditionally the wholesale and retail trade sectors have been 
dependent on both public and private sector expenditures. While this 
remains the case for private sector expenditures, public sector 
expenditures currently have only a short-run transitory effect on the 
sector’s output.   
4. In a major change from earlier periods, output in the construction 
sector is no longer dependent on public expenditures. Instead, output in 
this sector now depends primarily on the long term pattern of private 
sector expenditures. 
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5. Private expenditures have strengthened their linkages to the housing 
sector as well as transport, storage and communications sector. While 
output in this sector is still responsive to public sector expenditures this 
linkage has weakened over time. 
6. Other financial activities are dependent on private expenditures.  
However with regard to public expenditures this effect is confined to the 
longer term effects of governmental expenditures. 
7. Finally, linkages between private expenditures and the service 
sector (community, social and personal services) have strengthened 
considerably in recent years. This sector’s links to public sector 
expenditures have also weakened. 
In sum, the pattern found here is one of strengthening linkages 
between private sector expenditures and sectoral output. At the same time 
the ability of public sector expenditures to provide a positive stimulus to 
output has weakened considerably. In fact in several key sectors, non-oil 
manufacturing, and construction, public sector expenditures no longer 
play a role in affecting output growth. In others, agriculture, mining, 
trade, and services, public expenditures may only play a minor role in the 
overall growth of these areas of activity.  
3.2. The Impact of Public Expenditures on Private Expenditures 
Of course, one could always argue that the unlikelihood of private 
sector expenditures being sustained without a steady infusion of 
government expenditures. If that is the case, the links between public 
sector expenditures and sectoral output still exist, but have only become 
more indirect with time. To test this hypothesis, a statistical analysis 
similar to that between public/private expenditures and sectoral output 
was undertaken. Here the question was: is private expenditure dependent 
on government expenditures? Has this pattern changed with time?  The 
main findings (Table 2) suggest that over time there has been a  
weakening of the linkage between public and private expenditures similar 
to that occurring between public sector expenditures and real output. In 
fact, the only statically significant link between public expenditure and 
private expenditure in the 1980-2001 period occurred with an expansion 
in public infrastructure, which provided a short term stimulus to private 
investment. However, the longer term effects present between these two 
variables in the 1964-1980 period are apparently no longer present. 
The question that immediately arises as to the factors responsible for 
the deterioration in links between government expenditures and, for all 
practical purposes, the rest of the economy. Given the fall in the relative 
share of government expenditures in such areas as non-oil GDP, 
diminishing returns can no doubt be ruled out. The major changes in the 
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composition of the government’s budget noted above (Figure 5), would 




Saudi Arabian Sectoral Output:  
The Relative Efficacy of Public/Private Expenditures 
Sector  1964-2001 1964-1985 1975-2001 
    Agriculture    
 
Total Private Expenditures    
 Short Run + ins + 
 Long-Run + + + 
     
 
Total Public Expenditures 
Total Public Expenditures 
   
 Short Run İns + ins 
 Long-Run + + +  (weak) 
     
Mining     
 Total Private Expenditures    
 Short Run İns Ins ins 
 Long-Run İns Ins + (strong) 
     
 Total Public Expenditures    
 Short Run + +  
 Long-Run + + +  (weak) 
     
Manufacturing    
 Total Private Expenditures    
 Short Run + ins + 
 Long-Run + + + 
     
 Total Public Expenditures    
 Short Run ins ins ins 
 Long-Run ins + ins 
     
Wholesale-Retail Trade    
 
Total Private Expenditures    
 Short Run + + + 
 Long-Run + + + 
     
 Total Public Expenditures    
 Short Run + + + 
 Long-Run + + ins 
     
Construction     
 Total Private Expenditures    
 Short Run ins ins ins 
 Long-Run ins Ins +  
     
 Total Public Expenditures    
 Short Run + + İns 
 Long-Run ins + İns 
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Table 2 (continued)    
Sector  1964-2001 1964-1985 1975-2001 
     
Transport, Storage and Communication    
 Total Private Expenditures    
 Short Run + ins + 
 Long-Run + None + 
     
 Total Public Expenditures    
 Short Run + ins + 
 Long-Run + + (weak) 
     
Ownership of  Dwellings    
 Total Public Expenditures    
 Short Run + ins + 
 Long-Run + + (weak) 
     
 Total Public Expenditures    
 Short Run + ins + 
 Long-Run + + (weak) 
     
Other     
 Total Private Expenditures    
 Short Run + + + 
 Long-Run + + + 
     
 Total Public Expenditures    
 Short Run + ins + 
 Long-Run + + (weak) 
     
Community, Social and Personal Services    
 Total Private Expenditures    
 Short Run + + ins 
 Long-Run + Negative + 
     
 Total Public Expenditures    
 Short Run + İns ins 
 Long-Run + + + (weak) 
     
Notes: Data from Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. Calculations 
were made using the ARDL approach to cointegration developed by Pesaran and Pesaran 
(1997). Optimal variable lag structure is based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  
‘Ins’ = statistically insignificant; ‘+’ = positive impact statistically significant at the 95% level. 
 
3.3. Expenditure Categories and Revenues 
Again, aggregating the various sections of the government’s budget 
into four main categories, social expenditures, economic expenditures, 
public expenditures and defense, several interesting  statistical patterns 
emerge that may help to explain the falling stimulative effect of public 
expenditures on the non-oil private sector. First looking at the links 
between government revenues and expenditures (Table 3), economic 
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expenditures, public expenditures and defense follow a similar pattern: 
each expands in the short-run with increased government revenues (of 
course, they would also contract with falling revenues). This pattern 
carries over into the longer term with each category of expenditure 
maintaining a stable relationship with revenues. 
 
Table 3 
Saudi Arabia: The Impact of Public Expenditures on Private Expenditures 
 1964-2001 1964-1980 1980-2001 
    
Total Private Expenditures    
 Total Public Expenditures    
 Short Run + + ins 
 Long-Run + + ins 
     
 Short Run + + ins 
 Long-Run + + ins 
     
Private Investment    
 Total Government Investment    
 Short Run ins + ins 
 Long-Run ins + ins 
     
 Short Run + + + 
 Long-Run ins + ins 
     
Private Consumption    
 Total Public Consumption    
 Short Run + + ins 
 Long-Run + + ins 
     
 Expected Public Consumption    
 Short Run + + ins 
 Long-Run + + ins 
     
Notes: Data from Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. Calculations 
were made using the ARDL approach to cointegration developed by Pesaran and Pesaran 
(1997). Optimal variable lag structure is based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).        
‘Ins’ = statistically insignificant; ‘+’ = positive impact statistically significant at the 95% level. 
 
On the other hand, there does not appear to be any links, either short- 
or long-term between revenues and social expenditures. As noted, this 
category has been the fastest growing category of expenditures.  More 
importantly it, along with defense, now dominate the government budget.  
The fact that the expansion in social expenditures appears to be 
independent of the government’s revenue position suggests that either 
these allocations receive a much higher priority over other expenditures 
and / or that the government is willing to run large deficits to fund these 
programs. No doubt their rather steady increase until the last several 
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years means that they have played a rather limited, if any, role in 
macroeconomic stabilization.  
3.4. Social Expenditures and Budgetary Tradeoffs 
A closer look at social expenditures finds that their budgetary share 
has grown largely at the expense of several economic sections of the 
budget (Table 4), namely transport and communications and direct 
economic allocations.  In both  cases,  short  run  increases in social 
expenditures had a negligible impact on their budgetary shares. However 
the more fundamental long-term impact was clearly negative. The only 
economic category not adversely affected was infrastructure, where social 
expenditures did not appear to affect this categories’ budgetary share in 
either the short or longer term. 
The dramatic decline in the budgetary share of subsidies may be 
attributed in part to the growth of social expenditures. Both the short and 
long term impacts of expanded social expenditures reduced the 
proportion of the budget allocated to subsidies.  
 
Table 4 
Saudi Arabia Major Expenditure Categories Link to Revenues  
(1979-2002) 
Sector Impact Period Impact 
 
Social Expenditures  (human resource development, and health) 
 
Total Revenues  
 
Short Run ins 
 
Long-Run ins 
   
Economic Expenditures  (transport and communication, economic and 
infrastructure) 
 
Total Revenues  
 
Short Run + 
 
Long-Run positive 
   
Public Expenditures  (public administration, loans, and subsidies) 
 
Total Revenues  
 
Short Run + 
 
Long-Run positive 
   
Defense   
 
Total Revenues  
 
Short Run + 
 
Long-Run positive 
   Note: See Table 2. 
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Interestingly, defense allocations did not suffer at the hands of social 
expenditures5. Short run increases in the budgetary share going to social 
categories actually increased the share of the budget controlled by 
defense. The same was true for allocations to the municipalities. 
Governmental loans were the only budgetary sub-category unaffected by 
the expansion of social expenditures. The contraction of this category 
apparently was due in part to a shift in governmental priorities rather than 
a direct allocation conflict with social expenditures. 
3.5. Fiscal Linkages: Government Expenditures and Revenues 
In short, the high priority given to social expenditures, followed by 
defense, together with limited oil revenues during most of this period, 
resulted in a tremendous contraction in the public sector’s allocation to 
economic services of various types. This is verified in part by a final 
statistical analysis—the relationship between government revenues and 
public consumption and investment. 
As one might imagine, in a relatively resource constrained country as 
Saudi Arabia has become, there is a strong link between revenues and 
expenditures in both the short and long run (Table 5). However this 
pattern does not hold for the sub-categories of total expenditures (national 
accounts measure). In the case of public consumption, changes in 
revenues do not have a significant impact on year-to-year allocations. 
One interpretation is that since much of this expenditure represents 
salaries and many of the high priority social programs that can’t or won’t 
be altered by the authorities. They are relatively immune from short run 
revenue fluctuations. On the other hand, these categories form a strong 
long term relationship with revenues. 
In contrast, public investment appears much more discretionary in the 
short term—expanding and contracting in part to similar movements in 
revenues. On the other hand, public capital formation is not assured (as is 
consumption) a growing budget in line with revenues—despite the long 
term implementation of capital projects, there is no corresponding link 
between them and the government’s available revenues. Public capital 
formation is largely treated as a low priority, discretionary section of the 
budget. 
All and all, it is somewhat surprising that Saudi Arabia has not taken 
steps to establish an ‘oil stabilization fund’ that would receive windfall 
revenues during high  oil  price  periods  and  disperse funds for 
                                               
5
  Using different statistical techniques, a similar result was previously found in Looney  
(1991, 1992).  
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government operations during low oil price periods6. Given the country's 
huge reserve base and relatively small population, there appears to be no 
perceived need to save some current oil revenues and invest them for 
future generations. 
Table 5 
Saudi Arabia: Social Expenditures and Budgetary Tradeoffs 
(budgetary shares)  
Sector  Social Expenditure Impact 
   Transport Commonications  
 
Social Expenditures  
 





Social Expenditures  
 





Social Expenditures  
 
Short Run ins 
 
Long-Run ins 
Municipalities   
 
Social Expenditures  
 
Short Run + 
 Long-Run ins 
Defense   
 
Social Expenditures  
 
Short Run + 
 
Long-Run no relationship 
Public Administration  
 
Social Expenditures  
 
Short Run negative 
 
Long-Run ins 
Loans   
 
Social Expenditures  
 
Short Run ins 
 
Long-Run ins 
Subsidies   
 
Social Expenditures  
 









                                               
6
  Oil stabilization funds are no panacea.  They are not simple to properly administer, nor do 
they always assure an improved pattern of public expenditures (Davis,  Ossowski,  Daniel 
and Barnett, 2001).    
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Table 6 
Saudi Arabian Fiscal Linkages:  
Government Expenditures and Revenues 
 
 1964-2001 1964-1980 1980-2001 
 
    
Total Puplic Expenditures (government consumption and investment) 
 
Total Government Revenues    
 Short Run + Ins + 
 Long-Run + ins + 
Public Consumption    
 Total Government Revenues    
 Short Run + ins ins 
 Long-Run + ins + 
Public Investment    
 Total Government Revenues    
 Short Run + ins + 
 Long-Run + ins ins 
     
Note: See Table 2. 
 
4. Assessment 
The findings noted above have a number of implications for economic 
policy in the kingdom. Clearly, government expenditures will have to be 
refocused on activities directly supportive of private sector investment.  
Despite the recent rise in oil revenues, the welfare state will have to be 
scaled back somewhat and higher priority given to economic budgetary 
allocations. More emphasis must be placed on efficiency and productivity 
in government activities. There is tremendous waste in government 
ministries that will have to be dealt with. A recent study (Ghafour, 2003) 
found that sixty-nine percent of civil servants in the Kingdom stay away 
from work without a good reason while 54 percent come to work late. An 
environment will have to be created that encourages investment and 
provides better incentives for risk taking and job creation.   
In short, the economy will have to be made much more efficient and 
productive if it is to meet the needs and aspirations of Saudi population. 
In this regard a model of growth and terrorism developed by Bremer and 
Kasarda (2002)7 may be suggestive of the tasks that lie ahead.  Bremer 
and Kasarda see countries moving through three distinct stages as their 
economies evolve, become more sophisticated and market driven.  By 
their criterion, Saudi Arabia falls in the first stage (along with countries 
such as Egypt Iran and Pakistan (Figure 6). This group has failed to move 
forward to the middle stage largely because of growth-limiting policies 
                                               
7
   For an application of this model to Pakistan, see Looney (2003). 
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and institutional rigidities. The one thing that the nations stuck in the 
early phase have in common is slowness in adopting choice based 
systems. Bremer and Kasarda define ‘choice-based’ systems as 
encompassing both market-based economies and democratic political 
institutions and organizations.   
 
Figure 6 
New Second World Transitions 
 
Source: Drawn by author from a description provided in Bremer and Kasarda (2002). 
 
As in the case of Rostow’s (1960) stage-theory of growth, a major 
limitation of Bremer and Kasarda’s view of development is that it tends 
to be one-dimensional—countries must progress through the same set of 
reforms, tightly sequenced in a fairly strict period of time.  There is an 
element of truth to the Bremer-Kasarda’s approach and their placing 
Saudi Arabia in an early stage of evolution—progress does appear to 
have stalled. The fact remains however the Saudis have made 
considerable progress over the years in liberalizing their economy.   
The critical question for Saudi policymakers is how best to build on 
the past. While recently coming under criticism in many quarters, the 
standard neo-liberal model (Looney, 2003) is still the main paradigm of 
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globalization. To provide the incentives to energize the private sector, the 
main economic task confronting Saudi policy makers will be in finding 
ways to modify and adopt the neo-liberal model to the kingdom’s unique 
institutions so that growth can proceed in a non-disruptive manner. 
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Özet  
Suudî Arabistan’ın güç durumu: Ekonominin büyümeyi sürdürememesi 
Son zamanlarda görülen petrol fiyatlarındaki artıştan önce, Suudî Arabistan 
ekonomisinde bir daralma gözlemleniyordu. Petrol gelirlerinde bir yükselme olmadan 
ekonominin büyümeyi sürdürebilmesi zor görünüyordu. Bu makalenin amacı 
ekonomideki sürekli kötüye gidişin ana etkenlerini belirlemektir. Hükümet harcamaları 
incelendiğinde, bu harcamalarla petrol-dışı sektörler arasındaki bağlantıların bozulması 
ülke ekonomisinin daralmasında önemli bir etken olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Hükümet 
harcamalarının özel sektör faaliyetlerini teşvik etme gücünde görülen azalmanın, büyük 
ölçüde hükümetin sosyal ve savunma harcamalarına verdiği öncelikten kaynaklandığı 
düşünülmektedir. Bu da, ekonominin sürdürebilir büyümeyi petrol sektöründeki 
gelişmelerden bağımsız bir şekilde başarabilmesi için hükümet harcamalarının özel sektör 
yatırımlarının teşvikine doğru kaymasını gerektirir. Refah devletinin küçültülmesine ve 
daha ekonomik dağıtımların yapılmasına öncelik verilmelidir. Ayrıca, hükümet 
faaliyetlerinde etkinlik ve üretkenlik daha çok vurgulanmalıdır. 
 
